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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
LEEANN NAY, individually and as
personal representative for
MATTHEW and MERISSA NAY, the
heirs of ROBERT NAY; and
VIRGINIA NAY, individually
and as personal representative
for CONNIE WHEELER, CAROLYN
GALLEGHER, JOAN NAY and
JALYNN NAY, the heirs of
WAYNE NAY,

Appeal No. 910244 & 910273

(Argument Priority 16)

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, GMC
TRUCK DIVISION AND RON GREEN
CHEVROLET PONTIAC GMC, INC.,
Defendants/Appellees.
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3) (i) . The Utah Court of Appeals
has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §782a-3(3)(h).
This appeal is from a final judgement entered by the
Third Judicial

District

Court

Honorable Judge Richard Moffat.

for the County

of Salt Lake,

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court err in granting respondent's
Motion for a Directed Verdict in light of appellants1 weighty
expert witness testimony?
Standard of Review: The evidence must be examined in the light most
favorable to the losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis
in the evidence and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom that
would support a judgement in favor of the losing party, the
directed

verdict

cannot

be

sustained.

Grevstone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896

Management

Comm. v.

(Utah 1982); Anderson v.

Gribble, 30 Utah 2d 68, 513 P.2d 432 (1973); U.R.Civ.P. 50.
2. Did the trial court err by granting respondentf s
Motion in Limine, thereby excluding evidence of respondent's 1973
recall of passenger cars designed substantially similar to the
vehicle involved in the accident (NHTSA 73-0013)?
Standard of Review: Erroneous exclusion of evidence is a ground for
reversal if it appears that the evidence excluded would have had a
substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict or
finding. Hill v. Hartog, 658 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1983); Bradford v.
Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980); Downey St. Bank v. MajorBlakenev Corp., 578 P.2d 1286 (1978);
61.

2

U.R.Evid. 103; U.R.Civ.P.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Rule 50(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
A party who moves for a directed verdict at
the close of the evidence offered by an
opponent may offer evidence in the event that
the motion is not granted, without having
reserved the right to do so and to the same
extent as if the motion had not been made. A
motion for a directed verdict which is not
granted is not a waiver of trial by jury even
though all parties to the action have moved
for directed verdicts.
A motion for a
directed verdict shall state the specific
ground(s) therefor. The order of the court
granting a motion for a directed verdict is
effective without any assent of the jury.
Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.
Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the
United States or the Constitution of the state
of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by
other rules applicable in courts of this
state. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Nature of the Case.
This is a products liability action concerning a 1986 GMC
High Sierra truck which was involved in an accident on September
20, 1986, killing Robert Nay and Wayne Nay. The appellants contend
3

that the accident was caused when a stone became

lodged

in a

"pinch-point" between the flexible coupling and the end retainer
nut on the steering box (i.e. inside the steering coupling)(See
Exhibit "A"1) . The appellants also contend that the "pinch-point"
constituted a defect which was unreasonably dangerous to users of
the vehicle.
2.

Course of the Proceedings

On September 19, 1988, the heirs of Wayne Nay and Robert
Nay brought this action in the Third Judicial District Court for
Salt Lake County.

The appellants alleged that the manufacturer,

General Motors, negligently

designed the 198 6 GMC High

Sierra

vehicle. The appellants also alleged strict liability, breach of
warranty, and res ipsa loquitur.
1

The steering coupling depicted in Exhibit A was offered and
received in evidence and was examined by the jury at trial (Trial
Exhibit P-l). The flexible coupling and the end retainer nut
depicted in Exhibit A are exemplar, i.e., identical to or the same
as those in the Nay vehicle. When the Nay Vehicle was initially
inspected, the "stone interference" theory was not considered and
thus the flexible coupling and the end retainer nut were not
retained. However, the steering box depicted is the actual one
taken from the Nay vehicle.
The photographs in Exhibit A show
different parts of the steering coupling from different angles. At
trial, a stone was placed within the steering coupling, i.e.
between the flexible coupling and the end retainer nut, and each
juror was allowed to feel the tension on the steering wheel created
by the "stone interference". However, it should be noted that the
stones depicted in the photographs are not the stones offered and
received in evidence at trial and the photographs themselves were
not offered or received into evidence at trial. They are shown
here in Exhibit A solely for illustrative purposes and to avoid the
necessity of making trial Exhibit P-l, which was offered and
received in evidence at trial, available to each member of the
court for individual inspection from different angles, as it was
for the court and jury in the trial court.
4

On May 15, 1990, respondent General Motors made a Motion
in Limine to exclude evidence of a 1973 recall (NHTSA 73-0013) of
its passenger vehicles which were designed similar to the vehicle
involved in the crash.

The appellants countered, contending that

the recall was probative evidence of General Motor's negligence,
and that the appellants had illustrated sufficient similarities
between the vehicles recalled and the vehicle involved in the
accident to warrant admission of the recall statements.

The

District Court granted respondentf s Motion in Limine by minute
entry dated September 28, 1990, and prohibited the appellants from
introducing evidence of the recall at trial.
The case proceeded to trial on October 1, 1990.
trial, the appellants introduced

expert testimony

During

from three

witnesses, all of which indicated that a foreign object could
become lodged in a "pinch-point" in the steering mechanism, which
would prevent the driver from steering the vehicle. Each believed
and testified that the accident was caused by General Motors
negligently

designing the steering mechanism which allowed a

foreign object to become lodged in the "pinch-point" between the
flexible coupling (moveable part) and the end retainer nut (nonmoveable part).
The jury received the case with special interrogatories
on October 11, 1990.

After six hours of deliberation, the jury
5

requested further instructions from the Court. The jury was unable
to muster the six votes needed to answer several of the special
interrogatories. The trial court instructed the jury that if they
could not agree, a verdict against the party having the burden of
proof could be returned with fewer than six votes. (Judgement on
Jury Verdict, pp. 1-2). The jury then returned a verdict for the
respondent. (Id. at 2).
The

appellants

polled

the

jury.

On

the

special

interrogatories where the jury found that the respondent did not
negligently design the vehicle, the jury was evenly split.

Four

jurors disagreed with the verdict, and would hcive found General
Motors negligent. Four jurors agreed with the verdict. (Judgement
on Jury Verdict p. 2) . Nevertheless, the Court entered a judgement
for respondent based on the juryfs verdict. (Id. at 5).
The appellants moved for a new trial on November 2, 1990,
contending that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to find
for the respondent with less than the three-fourths majority
required by Article I, Section 10 of the Utah Constitution and Rule
47 (q) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The trial court

agreed, and set aside the jury verdict as defective on May 23,
1991.

Appellants1 Motion for New Trial was granted through an

Order issued April 15, 1991.

However, after the trial court

6

granted

appellants1

Motion

for New

Trial,

the

court

granted

respondent's Motion for Directed Verdict.
In a minute entry dated May, 3, 1991, the court indicated
that it had intended to grant respondent's Motion for Directed
Verdict and deny appellants' Motion for New Trial.

The Court

issued an Amended Order on May 23, 1991 reflecting these changes.
The appellants filed a Notice of Appeal on May 14, 1991,
challenging

the

original

appellants' Motion
Directed Verdict.

April

for New

15,

Trial

1991

and

Order

granting

respondent's

Motion

both
for

The appellants also challenged the May 3, 1991

minute entry denying their Motion for New Trial.
A second Notice of Appeal was filed on May 31, 1991,
challenging the May 23, 1991 Order, which was based on the May 3,
1991 minute entry.

Also challenged was the Court's minute entry of

September 28, 1990, granting respondent's Motion in Limine which
excluded evidence of respondent's prior recalls.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On July 3, 1986, Wayne Nay purchased a 1986 GMC High
Sierra pickup truck with four wheel drive from Ron Green Chevrolet,
Pontiac, GMC, Inc.

Wayne Nay returned the vehicle for a 1000 mile

checkup on August 25, 198 6.

The High Sierra was checked for

possible problems during this inspection and minor repairs were
made.
7

On September 20, 1986, Wayne Nay was travelling with his
nephew, Robert Nay, and Robert's son Matthew in the GMC High Sierra
truck. When Nay tried to negotiate a slight curve on Convulsion
Coal Mine Road in Salina Canyon, Utah, the steering locked. Unable
to turn, the vehicle travelled in a straight path over the edge of
a steep embankment.
Wayne Nay died shortly after the accident, (T. Vol. I, p.
85, 1. 3-5), but not before he told LeEarl Nay, who had arrived on
the scene shortly after the accident, that he had tried to turn the
steering wheel but it would not turn (T. Vol. I. p. 84, 1. 12-14).
Robert Nay died shortly after the accident from his injuries. Only
Matthew

Nay

survived;

he

witnessed

Wayne

Nay

attempting

unsuccessfully to turn the steering wheel (T. Vol. I. p. 61, 1. 1415) and applying the brakes (T. Vol. I. p. 60, 1. 21-22; p. 66, 1.
10-14); he

observed the vehicle go over the embankment and

witnessed the deaths of his father and granduncle (T. Vol. I. p.
61, 1. 23-24).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I. THE DIRECTED VERDICT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE APPELLANTS
STATED CLAIMS OP NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY AGAINST RESPONDENT
The appellants were required to establish not only that
the vehicle contained an unreasonably dangerous defect at the time
the vehicle left General Motors, but also that the defect caused
the accident in order to recover against General Motors.
8

The appellants provided sufficient evidence of each of
these elements to state a claim against General Motors,

The

appellants1

was

expert

witnesses

testified

that

the

vehicle

defective because the flexible coupling was designed
proximity to the end retainer nut.

in close

This design allowed a stone to

become lodged inside the steering coupling, causing the steering to
jam, and preventing Wayne Nay from turning the vehicle. The expert
witnesses

further

testified

that

the

defect

was

unreasonably

dangerous and could have been eliminated at little cost to General
Motors.
The appellants also demonstrated that this defect caused
the accident. Two of appellants1 expert witnesses, Lindley Manning
and Dr. Ben Bayse, testified that the accident was caused by a
stone lodged in the "pinch point" between the flexible coupling and
retainer nut.

These experts also testified that the wheels were

pointed straight when the vehicle went over the cliff, indicating
that

Nay

could

not

turn

the

vehicle.

An

accident

reconstructionist, David Stephens, also determined that the wheels
were pointed straight as the vehicle plunged into the ravine.
All of the expert witnesses concluded that there was no
driver error committed by Wayne Nay.

Finally, the appellants

established that there was a possibility that a stone could be
flipped up by a tire into the coupling area.
9

This evidence was

sufficient to state a claim against General Motors, and therefore
the directed verdict must be reversed.
II. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ADMITTED EVIDENCE OF A 1973 RECALL
BY GENERAL MOTORS OP PASSENGER CARS DESIGNED SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR
TO THE NAY VEHICLE.
In 1973, General Motors recalled 3.7 million "B" cars
because there was a possibility that a stone would become lodged
between the flexible coupling (moving part)and the frame (nonmoving part).

Here, the appellants have alleged that a stone

became lodged between the flexible coupling (moving part) and the
end retainer nut (non-moving part).
The Fifth Circuit, in a nearly identical case, has
already

ruled

that the notices

issued by General

Motors in

connection with the 1973 recall should be admitted to establish the
possibility that a stone could become lodged inside the steering
coupling. Lowe v. General Motors Corp. , 624 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir.
1973) (See Exhibit "D") . The Court in Lowe found that the danger
necessitating

the

recall

(stone becoming

lodged

between

the

steering coupling and the engine wall) was substantially similar to
the danger of a stone becoming lodged inside the steering coupling
(between the flexible coupling and the end retainer nut), and
therefore the recall notices should have been admitted. This Court
should follow Lowe and hold that the notices are relevant to
establish the defective nature of the vehicle.
10

These recall notices are relevant evidence to establish
that the design of the vehicle was defective- The notices are also
relevant not only to bolster the credibility

of the expert

witnesses but also to bolster the appellants1 explanation of the
accident.

Finally, the recall notices are relevant evidence that

General Motors was aware that designing the flexible coupling in
close proximity to a non-moving part constituted an unreasonably
dangerous defect.

This awareness supports the appellants1 claim

for punitive damages.
The appellants have established that the Nay vehicle was
designed substantially similar to the vehicles involved in the
recall.

Dr. Ben Bayse has testified that the steering system used

in the Nay vehicle was essentially and substantially equivalent to
the steering system in the vehicles that were recalled in 1973.
General Motors own stone interference expert, Jerry Confer, has
testified that the design of the B cars was identical to the design
of the Nay vehicle.
These notices should have been admitted to establish that
the vehicle's design constituted an unreasonably dangerous defect,
to establish the credibility of the expert witnesses presented by
both sides, and to establish awareness on the part of General
Motors, which is relevant for a claim of punitive damages.

11

ARGUMENT
I
THE APPELLANTS PROVIDED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO STATE A CLAIM OF
NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY AGAINST GENERAL MOTORS. THEREFORE,
THE DIRECTED VERDICT GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE
OVERTURNED.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a directed verdict, this Court applies the
same standard as that applied by the District Court, Management
Comm. v. Greystone Pines, Inc. , 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982).

The

evidence in the record must be such that reasonable men could not
arrive at different conclusions. Id.; Anderson v. Gribble, 30 Utah
2d 68, 513 P.2d 432 (1973); Rhiness v. Dansie, 24 Utah 2d 375, 472
P.2d 428 (1970).

Furthermore, all evidence must be viewed in the

light most favorable to the appellants. Finlayson v. Brady, 121
Utah 204, 240 P.2d 491 (1952); Boskovich v. Utah Constr. Co., 123
Utah 387, 259 P.2d 885 (1953).

Thus, if there is any evidence in

the record which could support a verdict for the losing party, the
directed verdict must be reversed.

Management Comm. v. Greystone

Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982).
B. THE APPELLANTS PROVIDED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO STATE A CLAIM FOR
RELIEF
The District Court instructed the jury that in order for
appellants to prevail, three elements had to be established: 1)
that a defect existed in the vehicle involved in the accident; 2)
12

that

the

defect

existed

at the time

the

vehicle

left the

manufacturer; and 3) that the defect was the proximate cause of the
accident. (Jury Instruction #24}. See Ernst W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco
Steel Co. , 601 p.2d 152 (Utah 1979); Dowland v. Lyman Products for
Shooters, 642 P.2d 380 (Utah 1982); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§402A.
The District Court further instructed the jury, over
appellants1

objection, that the vehicle must be "unreasonably

dangerous" as a result of the defect

(Jury Instruction 23) .

Dowland, 642 P. 2d at 381. Unreasonably dangerous was defined by the
trial court as a danger beyond that which would be contemplated by
the ordinary and prudent buyer of the vehicle (Jury Instruction
#22). The appellants presented substantial evidence to prove each
of the above elements of their strict liability claim.
1. The Vehicle Contained a Design Defect
The

appellants

provided

extensive

unreasonably dangerous defect in the vehicle.

evidence

of

an

The defective

condition was the location of the flexible coupling in close
proximity to the end retainer nut on the steering box,

creating

a

"pinch-point". (See Exhibit "A"; See also Trial Exhibits 68-69, 6465, and 38-42, showing the flexible coupling in close proximity to
the end retainer nut, creating the "pinch point". The nut and the
coupling together constitute the steering coupling).
13

This defect

allowed a stone to become lodged inside the steering coupling,
causing the steering mechanism to jam, resulting in a total loss of
steering.
Each of the appellants1 expert witnesses testified as to
the defective nature of the vehicle.

Lindley Manning testified

that the close clearing between the end retainer nut and the
coupling was a defect resulting in an unreasonably dangerous
condition.

(T. Vol. I, p. 21 1. 12-15).

Mr. Manning successfully

placed stones between the coupling and the end retainer nut which
resulted in a total loss of steering (T. Vol. I, p. 22-24). Manning
demonstrated this to the jury during the trial (T. Vol. I, p. 23,
1. 1-10).
Dr. Ben Bayse likewise testified that the design of the
vehicle, which allowed a foreign object to become lodged in the
"pinch point", was defective
Lindley

Manning

testified

(T. Vol. I, p. 184, 1. 15-24).

that

the

product

would

still

be

unreasonably dangerous even if the probability was slight that a
stone could become lodged inside the steering coupling (T. Vol. I,
p. 40, 1. 8-15) . Dr. Bayse was also able to recreate the defective
condition by placing a stone inside the steering coupling, which
resulted in a total loss of steering. (T. Vol. I, p. 189-90).
Lindley Manning testified that the possibility of a stone becoming

14

inside the steering coupling was foreseeable and should have been
corrected by General Motors (T. Vol. I, p. 40, 1. 16-22).
David Stephens, an accident reconstructionist, testified
that the stone interference theory was reasonable, (T. Vol. I, p.
141, 1. 17-20), and was also able to lodge a stone in the "pinch
pointff between the coupling and the retainer nut, which resulted in
a total loss of steering (T. Vol. I, p. 261, 1. 1-2).
Both Dr. Bayse and Lindley Manning testified that General
Motors could have eliminated this defect at little cost.

Both

testified that the defect could have been eliminated by designing
the flexible coupling further from the end retainer nut (T. Vol I,
pp. 180, 1. 17-23; p. 225, 1. 14-25; p. 28, 1. 8-21).

Dr. Bayse

testified that designing the vehicle without the "pinch point"
could have been accomplished with ease and at little expense (T.
Vol. I, p. 190, 1. 20-25, p. 220, 1. 19-24).
Dr. Bayse provided a photograph of a 1984 Dodge vehicle,
(Trial Exhibits 74-76), which illustrated that Dodge was able to
design

out this defect by

locating the flexible

coupling a

substantial distance from the end retainer nut, thus eliminating
the pinch-point.
Lindley Manning testified that the defect could have been
eliminated by "reversing the ears" (T. Vol. I, p. 29, 1. 3-13).
The ears are metals tips that protrude from the nut.
15

By pointing

these ears toward the steering box rather than toward the flexible
coupling, the potential of stones becoming lodged in the pinch
point would be greatly diminished (Id.).
Both expert witnesses testified that the defect could be
eliminated by installing a guard over the steering coupling (T.
Vol. I, p. 179, 1. 1-5; p. 29, 1. 30). This guard would protect
against any stones becoming lodged inside the steering coupling.
Dr. Manning testified that the cost of such a guard would be less
than one dollar. (T. Vol. I, p. 30, 1. 15-19).
Both also testified that the purpose of the flexible
coupling is to reduce the noise in the passenger compartment and
that there is no reason why the flexible coupling (moveable part)
has to be in such close proximity to the end retainer nut (nonmoveable part) in order to reduce this noise. Rather, the flexible
coupling could accomplish the reduction in noise in the passenger
compartment at any distance from the end retainer nut.
2. This Defect was the Cause of the Accident.
The trial court instructed the jury that the appellants
had the burden of proving that the defect in the vehicle caused the
accident. The appellants provided extensive evidence to establish
that the accident was caused by a stone becoming lodged inside
steering coupling at the very point the expert witnesses described
as defective.
16

Lindley Manning testified that the most probable cause of
the accident was the inability of the driver, Wayne Nay, to turn
the vehicle due to a stone lodged inside the steering coupling,
i.e. between the flexible coupling and the end retainer nut (T.
Vol. I, p. 12, 1. 9-20).

Dr. Bayse also found that the accident

was caused by a foreign object lodged in the "pinch point" which
prevented Wayne Nay from turning the vehicle.
1. 22-25).

(T. Vol. I, p. 218,

He could find no other reasonable explanation for the

accident. (T. Vol. I, p. 232, 1. 1-3). David Stephens also believed
that stone interference was a reasonable explanation for the
accident (T. Vol. I, p. 141, 1. 17-20).
The

appellants1

expert

witnesses

also

conducted

experiments which indicated that Wayne Nay could not turn the
vehicle. David Stephens, an accident reconstructionist, measured
the track left by the tires when they were pointed straight ahead
at 7 1/2 inches wide (T. Vol. I, p. 135, 1. 5-9).

When the

vehiclefs tires were turned to the left, but the vehicle was
travelling straight, the tires left a track of 12 inches (T. Vol.
I, p. 135, 1. 10-12).

When Mr. Stephens measured the tire tracks

left by the Nay vehicle at the accident scene, he found the them to
be 7 1/2 inches wide (T. Vol. I, p. 135, 1. 13-17).

Mr. Stephens

therefore concluded that the Nay vehicle's tires were pointed
straight ahead when the vehicle plunged into the ravine.
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Lindley Manning reached the same conclusion.

When he

visited the accident scene, he determined that the tires were
pointed straight ahead (T. Vol. I, p. 16, 1. 15-18).

He could find

no evidence of a plowing effect, which would be expected if the
wheels were turned but the vehicle was travelling straight (T. Vol.
I, p. 16, 1. 1-13). The

investigating

officer's

diagrams

also

indicate that the Nay vehicle travelled in a straight path over the
cliff. (See Trial Exhibits 21-22, attached as Exhibit " B " ) .
Also, the only eye witness to the accident, Matthew Nay,
testified that he saw Wayne Nay trying in vain to turn the vehicle
and also applying the brakes (T. Vol. I, p. 61, 1. 11-13; p. 66, 1.
10-15; p. 16, 1. 22-24).

The driver the vehicle, Wayne Nay, told

LeEarl Nay before he died at the scene that the "goddamn truck
didn't turn" (T. Vol. I, p. 84, 1. 13-14).
Thus, the appellants established for the jury that Wayne
Nay tried to steer the vehicle but that the vehicle could not be
turned.

The tire tracks leading over the edge of the cliff were

pointing straight ahead. Both of the appellants1 expert witnesses
testified that the reason the vehicle could not be turned was that
there was a stone lodged inside the steering coupling between the
flexible steering coupling and the end retainer nut (T. Vol. I, p.
12, 1. 9-20; p. 218, 1. 22-25).
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In defending this action, General Motors has contended
that driving error committed by Wayne Nay was the sole cause of the
accident. However,

each

of the

appellants1

expert witnesses

testified that driver error did not contribute to the accident.
David Stephens investigated driver error but could find no evidence
of error (T. Vol. I, p. 117, 1. 21-24).

Lindley Manning found that

Wayne Nay was not travelling at excessive speed, (T. Vol. I, p. 13,
1. 11-17) , and that the brakes did not lock when Wayne Nay applied
them. (T. Vol. I, p. 13, 1. 13-14). Manning reached this conclusion
by measuring the width of the tracks left by the Nay vehicle, which
indicated that the wheels were pointed straight (T. Vol I, p. 14,
1. 1-6) (See also Exhibit "B") . If the brakes were locked, Wayne Nay
would have been able to steer the vehicle, but the vehicle would
have skidded rather than turned (Id.)*

Because the wheels were

straight, he determined that Wayne Nay tried to turn the vehicle
but it would not turn (T. Vol. I, p. 13, 1. 11-17). Dr. Bayse
likewise concluded there was no driver error (T. Vol. I, p. 219, 1.
20-23) .
Finally, the appellants established that a stone could be
flipped by a tire into the steering coupling resulting in a total
loss of steering.

Lindley Manning testified that it is possible

for a stone to be kicked up into the steering coupling area (T.
Vol. I, p. 51, 1. 12-14).

David Stephens testified that stone
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chips are very common, (T. Vol. I, p. 150, 1. 21-25), and that the
tires of the High Sierra could have thrown stones up to an inch in
diameter into the steering coupling (T. Vol. I, p. 151, 1. 10-11).
Dr. Bayse concurred that stones could be thrown by the tires into
the steering coupling (T. Vol. I, p. 197, 1. 1-25).
Lindley Manning also testified that the possibility of a
stone being

kicked up

into the coupling

area would

not be

eliminated if the road was paved (T Vol. I, p. 37, 1. 19-25).
Nevertheless, David Stephens testified that the road had been sealcoated during the six weeks preceding the accident (T. Vol. I, p.
106, 1. 5-22) .

When the road was seal coated, stones and chips

were spread on the road to create the seal (Id.).

Stephens found

a thick layer of these stones and chips by the side of the road
where the accident occurred (Id.).
The appellants also introduced into evidence a report
prepared by the Value Engineering Laboratory entitled "Valuation of
the Steering of Obstruction Problems Conducted for the Insurance
Institute for Highway Safety." (Trial Exhibit 6).
concluded

that

"it was demonstrated

This report

that under some driving

conditions on gravel surfaces, gravel is kicked up into the area of
the steering coupling."

The report also contains photographs

depicting stones that have become lodged inside the steering
coupling.

(T. Exhibit 6, pp. 60-63).
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From this evidence, the jury could have concluded that it
was probable that a stone could be flipped up into the steering
coupling and possibly lodge between the flexible coupling and the
end retainer nut, thereby causing the accident.
3 . Defect existed when the vehicle left the manufacturer
The appellants have also established that the vehicle was
designed with the flexible coupling located near the end retainer
nut, creating the pinch-point.

Since this was a design defect

rather than a manufacturing defect, the defect existed at the time
the vehicle left the manufacturer.

This conclusion is buttressed

by the fact that the vehicle was purchased only three months prior
to the accident.

A strong inference is created that the vehicle

contained the defect when it left the manufacturer when the vehicle
suffers the failure soon after purchase.

Annotation, "Products

Liability: Admissability, Against Manufacturer, of Products Recall
Letter", 84 A.L.R.3d 1220 (1978).
CONCLUSION
The appellants
establish
defective.

have provided

that the design of the

extensive

evidence to

1986 GMC High Sierra was

Expert witnesses presented evidence establishing the

defective nature of designing the vehicle with a "pinch point"
between the flexible coupling and the end retainer nut.
expert

witnesses

also

testified
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that

it

was

possible

These
and

foreseeable that a stone could become lodged inside this steering
coupling.
The appellants have also demonstrated that this defect
The appellants1 expert witnesses

was the cause of the accident.

have testified that Wayne Nay was in no respect the cause of the
accident, but rather that the accident was caused by a stone
becoming lodged inside the steering coupling, between the flexible
coupling and the end retainer nut. Finally, the appellants have
presented evidence that there was a probability that a rock could
have been flipped into the steering coupling, causing a total loss
of steering.
Thus, appellants have provided extensive evidence to
support each element of their claim against General Motors.

The

directed verdict granted by the District Court was based on Judge
Moffat's belief that the appellants did not provide sufficient
evidence to state a claim against General Motors (T. Vol. I, p.
269, 1. 4-7; p. 270, 1. 15-20).

As stated at the outset, this

directed verdict can only stand if this Court determines that
reasonable minds could not differ as to evidence presented.

The

issue before the Court is whether the evidence outlined immediately
above can in any manner state a claim against General Motors.

On

the basis of the foregoing, a reasonable juror could have found for
the appellants and against the respondent. In fact, four jurors
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concluded that General Motors was negligent and that there was an
unreasonably dangerous design defect which caused the accident.
Therefore, the directed verdict must be reversed and the cause
tried anew,
C. FOUR REASONABLE JURORS DID FIND THAT APPELLANTS STATED A CAUSE
OF ACTION AGAINST RESPONDENT GENERAL MOTORS
In granting the directed verdict, Judge Moffat believed
that the appellants "didn't prove your case" and that stone
interference was not "a valid claim" (T. Vol. I, p. 269, 1. 7; p.
270, 1. 15-19) . This ignores the four members of the jury that did
believe that the appellants had proved their case and that the
stone interference claim was a valid claim.
The appellants have outlined the evidence presented to
the jury in order to establish that a juror could find that
respondent was negligent and that the vehicle was defective.
However, this Court has the benefit of direct evidence that
reasonable minds could, and did, disagree as to the evidence
presented by the appellants. When the appellants polled the jury
after the jury returned the verdict for respondent, four of the
jurors stated that they disagreed with the verdict and would have
returned a verdict against General Motors. These jurors would have
found that the close clearing between the flexible coupling and the
end retainer nut was a defect that was unreasonably dangerous.
These jurors believed that a stone lodged inside the steering
23

coupling was the cause of the accident. These jurors also believed
that General Motors negligently designed the vehicle.
that

four out of eight jurors

found the appellants1

The fact
evidence

sufficient to state an action against General Motors is ample
evidence that reasonable minds could differ.
Also, Judge Moffat apparently believed that the evidence
presented by appellants was sufficient to state an action against
General

Motors.

At the close

of appellants1

respondent moved for a directed verdict.

case

in chief,

This motion was denied.

Respondent also requested a jury instruction which instructed the
jury to return a verdict for the respondent.

This was also denied.

Thus, the trial court had ample opportunity to grant a directed
verdict if the appellants failed to state a claim.

Only after the

trial court improperly instructed the jury and accepted a verdict
without the support of six jurors was the directed verdict granted.
The fact that the trial court did not grant the directed verdict
earlier is probative evidence that the appellants stated a claim
for relief.
II
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE APPELLANTS TO INTRODUCE
EVIDENCE THAT IN 1973, GENERAL MOTORS RECALLED VEHICLES WITH
DESIGNS SIMILAR TO THE SUBJECT VEHICLE DUE TO STONE INTERFERENCE.
In October, 1973, General Motors issued recall notices on
3.7 million "B-cars" manufactured by its Chevrolet, Pontiac, Buick
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and Oldsmobile Motor divisions (NHTSA 73-0013) (See Exhibit "C"2) .
The

recall

was

required

due

to

a

defect

whereby

the

front

crossmember would scoop stones into the engine compartment.

There

was a potential that one of these stones could become

lodged

between the flexible coupling (moveable part) and the frame (nonmoving part), resulting in a partial loss of steering.
In order to correct this defect, General Motors placed a
steering coupling shield over both the flexible coupling and the
steering box, of which the end retainer nut is part. (See Exhibit
"C", letter to owners, paragraphs 2,5).

The purpose of this shield

was to prevent stones from becoming lodged between the steering
coupling and the frame.

Because the shield covered both the

flexible coupling and the end retainer nut, the shield also reduced
the possibility of a stone becoming lodged inside the coupling
itself, i.e. between the flexible coupling and the end retainer
nut.
Although General Motors chose to correct this defect in
its passenger

cars, where

there was

a potential

for

partial

steering loss because of the "pinch point" between the steering

2

Exhibit B contains a copy of the recall notice issued by
General Motors and also the letter sent to the NHTSA explaining the
defect. These were introduced at the Deposition of Gerald Confer.
(Ex. 1-3) . The final page is a summary of the recall campaign
compiled by Automobile Design Liability 2d, § 4:1.124, at 412
(1978).
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coupling and the frame, General Motors chose not to correct the
defect in the pickup truck, such as the Nay vehicle, where there
was a potential for complete steering loss because of the "pinch
point" within the steering coupling itself, i.e. between the
flexible coupling and the end retainer nut-

Such a failure by

General Motors is especially egregious in light of the fact that
pickup trucks are frequently driven on gravel roads and off-road
terrain, much more so than passenger cars, where the potential for
rocks or stones being flipped up or propelled into the area of the
steering coupling is far greater than on paved roads.
In the instant action, the appellants have alleged that
a stone was scooped into the engine compartment.

The stone then

became lodged inside the steering coupling, i.e. between the
flexible coupling (moving part) and the end retainer nut (nonmoving part).

This stone interference caused the steering to jam,

preventing Wayne Nay from turning the vehicle, and causing the
deadly crash. The appellants assert that the recall notices issued
by General Motors in 1973 are relevant evidence in this matter.
Rule

402

provides

that

all

relevant

evidence"

is

admissible unless otherwise proscribed by law. U.R.Evid. 402. Rule
401 defines "relevant evidence" as "evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
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would be without the evidence." U.R.Evid. 401.

The issue before

this court is whether the recall notices issued by General Motors
constitute relevant evidence which should have been admissible at
trial.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Erroneous exclusion of evidence is a ground for reversal
if

it appears that the evidence excluded

would

have had a

substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict or
finding.

Hill v. Hartog, 658 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1983); Bradford v.

Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980); Downey St. Bank v. Major
Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1978).

Here, the exclusion of

the recall notices was error and that admission of the recall
notices would have had a substantial effect in bringing about a
different result.

Reversal is therefore warranted.

B. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT HAS ALREADY RULED THAT THE RECALL NOTICES
ISSUED BY GENERAL MOTORS IN 1973 ARE ADMISSIBLE TO ESTABLISH THAT
A STONE COULD BECOME LODGED INSIDE THE STEERING COUPLING.
The recall notices issued by General Motors in 1973
(NHTSA 73-0013) should have been admissible at trial.

The Fifth

Circuit, in an almost identical case, has already ruled that the
recall notices issued by General Motors during their 1973 recall
campaign (NHTSA 73-0013) should be admissible to show that a stone
could become lodged inside the steering coupling, i.e. between the
flexible coupling and the end retainer nut, resulting in a total
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loss of steering. Lowe v. General Motors Corp. r 624 F.2d 1373 (5th
Cir. 1973) (a copy of is attached as Exhibit "D").
The facts in Lowe are nearly identical to those in the
present case3. On September 17, 1973, Elva Fulford drove her 1971
Chevrolet Impala to pick up her daughter Lou Ann Lowe.

She

travelled along a gravel road to her daughter's home, then returned
on a paved road. Suddenly, the vehicle inexplicably veered to the
left, and overturned down an embankment.
3

At the accident scene,

The appellants were unaware of this case before the trial
court because they were unaware of the claim. Obviously, General
Motors was aware of this claim and this case, but failed to so
advise appellants or the trial court. General Motors responded to
appellants1 First Set of Interrogatories, Number 6, which asked:
"Have any allegations been made by any person. . . that a . . .
power steering system including coupling, has locked up or jammed,
while in use so that the vehicle could not be properly steered?"
General Motors objected and then offered this: "Partial Answer:
Notwithstanding this objection, Willie Mae Busse v. GMC . . .
involved an allegation that a stone interfered with the flexible
coupling in a Chevrolet 1/2 ton pickup truck." The Court precluded
appellants from having their expert witness, Dr. Ben Bayse, testify
as to the details of that case, even though he was plaintiff's
expert witness in that case. In addition, General Motors responded
to appellants' First Request for Production of Documents, Number 3,
which asked: "Please produce . . . all documents . . . relating in
any way to complaints which have been made concerning the potential
for foreign objects to engage in the coupling and jam up the
steering system. . .?" General Motors objected and then gave this
"Response: General Motors has had one lawsuit involving an
allegation that a stone or other foreign object lodged between the
flexible coupling and the steering gear assembly in a 1/2 ton
pickup, inhibiting steering: Willie Mae Busse v. GMC, St. Louis
Circuit Court, Case No. 822-02064." (emphasis added). Arguably,
General Motors qualified its response, in "a 1/2 ton pickup" so as
to avoid having to disclose its knowledge of Lowe v. General
Motors, supra, and the impact which said case would have had in the
subject case.
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Mrs. Fulford told a witness, J. C. Champion, that the car had
suddenly become impossible to steer. A State Trooper that inspected
the vehicle found a stone lodged inside the steering coupling.
Chevrolet

Impala was one of the vehicles

The

recalled due to the

potential of stone interference between the steering coupling and
the frame (NHTSA 73-0013).
During the first trial, plaintiffs1 experts testified
that the accident was caused when a stone became lodged inside the
steering coupling, i.e. between the flexible coupling and the end
retainer nut.

The plaintiffs expert witnesses testified that the

design of the steering coupling was defective because it allowed
stones to fly up into the coupling area.

Id. at 1376.

The

plaintiffs were also allowed to introduce testimony regarding the
1973 recall of the Impala.
plaintiffs, and awarded

The jury returned a verdict for the

$500,000 to the heirs of the deceased

driver and $500,000 to the heirs of the deceased passenger.
However, the judge ordered a second trial and prohibited
the plaintiffs from introducing testimony regarding the 197 3 recall
during that trial.

After the second trial, the court granted

General Motorsf motion for directed verdict as to the failure to
warn claim, and the jury returned a verdict for General Motors as
to the other claims.

29

The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the recall
notices were relevant to establish not only the possibility that a
stone could become lodged inside the steering coupling, but also to
establish that General Motors failed to warn plaintiffs of the
hazardous design.

More specifically, the Court stated:

The risk of partial loss of steering due to a
stone lodged between the coupling and the
frame and the risk of total loss of steering
due to a stone lodged within the steering
coupling are quite similar dangers. It is not
unreasonable to infer that if GM knew of one
risk, they might have known of the other.
Id. at 1382 (emphasis added).

This conclusion was reached even

though General Motors argued that they had never known a stone to
become lodged inside the steering coupling, and that they had not
been able to lodge a stone inside the coupling during their
testing.
In the subject case, the appellants were prohibited by
the trial court from introducing evidence of the 1973 General
Motors recall because, in the trial court's opinion, the "pinch
point" between the flexible coupling and the frame (the defect
involved in the recall) was not the same as the "pinch point"
within the coupling itself, i.e. between the flexible coupling and
the end retainer nut.

The Fifth Circuit held that both "pinch

points" "are quite similar dangers." Lowe, 624 F.2d 1382.

Both

"pinch points" create the opportunity for a stone to become lodged
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in the "pinch point11. If a stone does become lodged, it can affect
the steering, to wit, a partial loss of steering if the stone
becomes lodged between the coupling and the frame but a total loss
of steering if the stone lodges within the steering coupling
itself.
Lowe demonstrates not only that the trial court here
erred by excluding the recall notices, but also that the recall
notices would likely have brought about a different result.

In

Lowe, the plaintiffs argued that a stone became lodged inside the
steering coupling.

Appellants in this action have also alleged

that a stone became lodged inside the steering coupling. In Lowe,
General Motors argued that they had never known of a stone becoming
lodged in the steering coupling.

General Motors advances this

argument here as well.
In Lowe, the plaintiffs sought to introduce the recall
notices issued by General Motors in 1973 to establish that the
design of the vehicle was defective and that General Motors was
aware of the potential for stone interference inside the steering
coupling. Appellants here seek introduction of the recall notices
in order to establish these same allegations.

The Fifth Circuit

found that the notices were relevant for these purposes because the
potential of interference between the steering coupling and frame
is quite similar to the potential for interference due to a stone
31

lodged inside the steering coupling, i.e between the flexible
coupling and the end retainer nut. Appellants in this case argued
before the trial court that the recall notices are relevant to
establish the same defect.

The relevant facts of Lowe are nearly

identical to those alleged by the appellants in this action. Like
Lowe, the recall notices should be admissible at trial.
Lowe also demonstrates that the introduction of the
recall notices would have a substantial impact on bringing about a
different result.

There, the plaintiffs prevailed during their

first trial, in which the recall notices were admitted.

Deprived

of these notices during the second trial, the plaintiffs failed to
persuade the judge and the jury as to their claims that General
Motors failed to warn them of the defective condition and that the
vehicle was defectively designed.
In the subject case, the appellants were prohibited by
the trial court from introducing evidence of the 1973 General
Motors recall.

Appellants were denied relief.

Like Lowe, the

introduction of the recall statements in the subject case would
have a substantial impact in bringing about a verdict for the
Appellants.

We respectfully ask this Court to follow Lowe and

allow evidence of the 1973 General Motors recall to be admitted at
trial in the subject case.
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C. THE DESIGN OF THE VEHICLE INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT WAS
SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR TO THE DESIGN OF THE VEHICLES RECALLED IN
1973.
In

oiTder to

establish thai: tiie recall notices

were

relevant, the appellants demonstrated that the design of the Nay
vehicle was substantially similar to the design of the vehicles
involved in the 1973 General Motors recall. See Hesson v. Jaguar
Cars, 915 F.2d 641 (11th Cir. 1990); Calhoun v. Honda Motor Co.,
738 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1984); Kane v. Ford Motor Co. , 450 F.2d 315
(3rd Cir. 1971).
The trial court excluded the recall notices because the
court believed that the design of the vehicle involved
accident and tfte design of the vehicles recalled

in the

in 1973 were

"entirely different and dissimilar" (Minute Entry, September 28,
1990) .

The appellants contend that the vehicles involved in the

recall were designed

substantially

similar to the High Sierra

involved in the accident.
Dr. Ben Bayse has testified that the "Saginaw steering
system used in the 1986 GMC High Sierra pickup truck driven by
Wayne Nay

• * * w ^s mechanically and functionally

essentially

equivalent to the steering system used in the 3,707,064 General
Motors

automobiles

which were

recalled

in

1973

(NHTSA

Recall

Campaign 73-0013)." (Aff. of Dr. Ben Bayse, 5. 4 ) . Furthermore, Dr.
Bayse has concluded that the steering parts were
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functionally

equivalent, resulting in a pinch point between the moving flexible
coupling and a non-moving part, (Aff. of Dr. Ben Bayse, 5. 5).
General Motors1 own expert on stone interference also
testified that fl[i]f you want to relate now to the steering gear or
the coupling, there1 s no difference between the B car and the
truck,

theyf re

the

same."

(Deposition

of

Gerald

Confer, p.

68B)(emphasis added)(attached as Exhibit "E").
As explained above in discussing the Lowe case, there is
also a relevant similarity between the defect involved in the
recall and the defect claimed in this action.

Through this

evidence, appellants established that the recalled vehicles and the
Nay vehicle were sufficiently similar in design to make the recall
notices relevant.
D. OTHER COURTS HAVE RULED THAT RECALL NOTICES ARE ADMISSIBLE TO
ESTABLISH THAT A DESIGN IS DEFECTIVE.
Other

courts

have

ruled

that

recall

notices

are

admissible to establish that a particular design is defective. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine so held in Maietta v. International
Harvester Co. , 496 A.2d 286 (Me. 1985).

In Maietta, the plaintiff

sought to introduce evidence of a prior school bus recall to
establish that the dump truck in which he was injured had a design
defect.

The Maine high court ruled that "[t]he school bus recall

would tend to demonstrate that false cycling was possible and that
it could cause a crash despite the abort mechanism.
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We find no

error in the trial court's ruling." Id. at 295. Just as the recall
in Maietta was relevant to establish that false cycling was
possible, the recall notices issued by General Motors are relevant
to establish that stone interference was possible and could have
caused the accident.
The Ninth Circuit has also ruled that recall notices are
relevant evidence that a particular design is defective.

In

Lonanecker v. General Motors Corp. , 594 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1979),
the Court held that the recall "letter was relevant evidence that
there was a flaw in the mounts, and the district court did not
abuse its discretion in receiving the letters." Id. at 1286. See
also Fields v. Volkswagen of America, 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976) ;
Gauche v. Ford Motor Co. , 226 So.2d 198 (La. 1969); General Motors
Co. v. Van Marter, 447 So.2d 1291 (Ala. 1984).
The Texas Court of Appeals recently decided a case
similar to the present case. Ford Motor Co. v. Durrill, 714 S.W.2d
329 (Tex.App. 1986).

In Durrill, the plaintiff was injured while

riding in a Ford Mustang II. Durrill sought to introduce evidence
of an earlier recall of the Ford Pinto due to the same defect
plaintiff claimed caused the accident involving the Mustang. Even
though the recall was for a different model and occurred during an
earlier model year, the Texas Court of Appeals held that the recall
evidence was admissible to establish not only that the design of
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the Mustang was defective in the same manner as the Pinto, but also
to bolster plaintiff's claim that Ford failed to warn plaintiff of
the danger in the Mustang. Id. at 340. See generally Annotation,
"Products

Liability:

Admissability,

Product Recall Letter."

Against

Manufacturer,

of

84 A.L.R.3d 1220 (1978).

E. THE RECALL NOTICES ARE RELEVANT TO ESTABLISH THE CREDIBILITY OP
THE EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY INTRODUCED BY BOTH PARTIES.
The recall notices are also relevant for the jury to
establish the credibility of the expert witness testimony presented
by both parties. The appellants' expert witnesses have vigorously
advanced the stone interference theory as a defect and also as the
cause of the accident.
characterized

the

"impossible".

General Motors1 expert witnesses have

appellants'

theory

as

"nonsense"

and

Yet the recall notices issued by General Motors in

1973 would establish that there is a possibility that a stone could
become lodged within the steering coupling, i.e. between the
flexible coupling (moveable part) and the end retainer nut (nonmoveable part).
On the basis of these recall notices, the jury could have
concluded that stone interference is a valid theory and thereby
discounted
contrary.

General
If

the

Motors'
recall

expert

witness

notices

testimony

established

that

to

the

stone

interference was a possible cause of the accident, the jury might
have dismissed as unreliable other testimony of General Motors'
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expert witnesses.

That the recall notices were issued by General

Motors would have been particularly relevant to the credibility of
General Motors1 expert witnesses, since these experts now contend
that stone interference is not a viable theory when the recall
notice was issued for that precise danger.
Also, the jury could have used the recall notices as
relevant evidence that appellants' theory was credible, and thereby
bolstered the appellants' expert witness testimony.

Without the

recall notices, the jury was forced to weigh only the conflicting
testimony of the expert witnesses. Admission of the recall notices
would have lent further credence to the appellants version of the
accident.
The recall notices are therefore relevant not only to
discredit the expert witnesses presented by General Motors,

but

also to bolster appellant's expert witness testimony regarding the
defect in the vehicle.
F. THE RECALL NOTICES ARE RELEVANT TO ESTABLISH KNOWLEDGE ON THE
PART OF GENERAL MOTORS, THEREBY SUPPORTING APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The 1973 recall notices issued by General Motors are also
relevant

to

support

appellants1

claim

for punitive damages.

Typically, strict liability is a no-fault action, and therefore the
manufacturer's conduct is irrelevant. FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY, § 5.05[2] (1989). But where the plaintiff alleges
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punitive damages, the focus shifts to the manufacturer's conduct•
Id. Recall notices are "relevant evidence" of this conduct.

The

recall notices indicate that the manufacturer had knowledge that a
particular design was defective and was unreasonably dangerous to
users of the product.
The Montana Supreme Court has held that recall notices
would tend to prove malice and are therefore relevant to support a
claim for punitive damages. Kuiper v. District Court, 632 P.2d 694
(Mont. 1981).

The California Court of Appeals has likewise found

that recall notices are relevant to establish knowledge by the
manufacturer

that

a particular design

is defective, thereby

supporting a claim for punitive damages.

Grimshaw v. Ford Motor

Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).
Here, the General Motors recall is relevant evidence that
General Motors was aware that placing the flexible coupling in
close proximity to a non-moving part would create a defect causing
the steering to malfunction. By allowing the recall notices to be
admitted into evidence, appellants could pursue their claim for
punitive damages.
The recall notices should have been admitted for these
purposes.

The notices were relevant evidence that the placing of

the flexible steering coupling in close proximity to a non-moveable
part, creating a pinch-point, constituted a defect.
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The notices

were also relevant to establish the credibility of the expert
witnesses introduced by both parties. Also, the notices bolstered
appellants1 contention that stone interference was a reasonable
explanation as to the cause of the accident. Finally, the notices
were probative evidence that General Motors was aware of the
dangers of placing the flexible coupling in close proximity to a
non-moving part.

This awareness could support appellants1 claim

for punitive damages.
The recall notices should have been admissible at the
trial of this matter. The appellants established that the design of
the Nay vehicle was substantially similar to the design of the
recalled vehicles, and was therefore relevant.

The notices were

relevant not only to establish that the design of the Nay vehicle
was defective, but also to establish the credibility of the expert
witness testimony offered by both parties.
The Fifth Circuit, in Lowe, has already held that these
recall notices were relevant in a case very similar to the subject
matter.

The Court in Lowe found that the potential of stone

interference between the steering coupling and the frame was quite
similar to the potential of stone interference inside the coupling,
i.e. between the flexible coupling and the end retainer nut. Lowe
follows the majority of cases which hold that recall notices are
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relevant in a products liability matter.

63 AmJur 2d Products

Liability §259.
REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION
The appellants respectfully request that the directed
verdict granted by the trial court to General Motors be reversed,
and a new trial ordered. At this new trial, the appellants request
that evidence of the 1973 recall (NHTSA 73-0013) of vehicles with
designs similar to the Nay vehicle be admissible.
DATED this

/7 day of July, 1991.
MORGAN & HANSEN

&4,hovJ J )7l^

Stephen G. Morgan
Attorney for Plaintif
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

// day of July, 1991, I

caused a true and correct copy of APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be hand
delivered to H. James Clegg, SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU, Attorney
for Defendants/Respondents, 10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor. P.O.
Box 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145.
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C H E V R O L E T MOTOR DIVISION
G«r*ral Motor* Corporation

(Certified Mail Notification Used by Chevrolet
Motor Division for All Owners of Record.)

C«*rai om— Wmrwm Mmmtu
30007 V#n Dy*.* Awm*

w«rr#n. M«*»g«n 4*»o

Dear Chevrolet Owner:
Our records indicate that you are the owner of a 1971 or 1972
Biscayne, Bel Air, Impala, Caprice or one of the following model
station wagons: Brookwood, Townsman, Kingswood or Kingswood
Estate.
In accordance with the notification provisions of the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, we are sending this
letter to urge you to have a steering coupling-shield installed
on your Chevrolet to prevent the possibility of a partial loss of
steering control should a stone lodge between the steering coupling and frame of your car. If you will take your car to any
Chevrolet dealer, this protective shield will be installed at no
charge to you.
Such an incident could occur when you drive your car on an unpaved
road surface if a stone should be thrown up into the engine compartment where it can lodge between the steering coupling and the frame.
If this should happen, it may cause increased steering effort or
interference with steering control of your car. It is possible
that it could even result in a partial loss of steering control.
If, before you have this shield installed, you are required to
drive on gravel roads, particularly those which are extremely wavy,
rutted or filled with chuck holes, you should not drive at speeds
which will cause your car to pitch excessively. You should reduce
your speed so that the front frame crossmember will not contact
the road surface and scoop up loose stones or gravel from the roadway.
Again, we urge you to contact any Chevrolet dealer and arrange for
installation of this steering coupling shield. There will be no
charge for the parts and labor involved. In the great majority of
cases the actual work to install this shield will take less than
15 minutes; however, prior to taking your car to a Chevrolet dealer,
we suggest that you contact the dealer's service department and
determine when parts and service time will be available. This will
enable the dealer to complete the installation in the 3hortest
possible time.

23*

Page - 2 -

The enclosed Campaign Claim Porm, GSD-761, identifies your vehicle.
Presentation of this form to your Chevrolet dealer will assist him
in completing the necessary modification to your vehicle.
We are sorry to cause you this inconvenience; however, we have taken
this action in the interest of your safety and continued satisfaction
with our products.

Chevrolet Motor Division
General Motors Corporation
Enclosure
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73-0013(fT)
G E N E R A L MOTORS CORPORATION

^MHMMWht
f - PLAINTIFFS DEPOSITION ]
1 j
EXHIBIT
I

January 19, 1973

I-

/

Mr. A. G. Detrick, Acting Diractor
Office of Defects Investigation
Motor Vehicle Programs
Rational Highway Traffic Safety Adm.
U. S. Department of Transportation
400 7th Street, S. V.
Washington, D. C. 20590
Dear Mr. Detrick:
The following information is submitted in accordance with requirements of
Federal Regulation 573.4 as it applies to a determination by General Motors
of a defect involving certain 1971 & 1972 Chevroleta, Pontiaca, Oldamobiles,
and Buicks.
573.4(c)(1) Chevrolet Motor Division, Pontiac Motor Division, Oldsmobile
Motor Division and Buick Motor Division of General Motors Corporation
573.4(c)(2)(3) (4)

See attached listing

573.4(c)(5) When these cars are driven on unpaved road surfaces, particularly roada which are heavily graveled and which are extremely wavy,
rutted or filled with chuck holes, at speeds which cause the car to pitch
excessively, the front crossmembcr may scoop-up loose stones or gravel from
the roadway. These stones may be thrown up into the engine compartment.
The possibility exists that one of these stones may lodge between the steering coupling and the frame and cause increased steering effort or interference
with steering control of the car when the steering wheel is turned to the
left.
573.4(c) (6)
Early in 1972 General Motors began investigating reports of
steering interference allegedly caused by stones becoming lodged in the area
between the steering shaft coupling and frame on 1971 and 1972 full-sire
General Motors cars. The NHTSA commenced its own investigation in which
General Motors participated by furnishing information and engaging in technical discussions with NHTSA personnel.
During its investigation, General Motors developed a protective shield to
cover the steering shaft coupling. In view of the unusual road and driving
circusMtances which were found to cause such interference, General Motors
issued a dealer service bulletin to idvise its dealers of the availability
of this shield, particularly to owners vho might encounter those circumstances. This shield was made available to owners on a no-charge basis.
222
C « w i Motor* B«Udlnt 9044 W H I Gfnd EUrclrvard

Dot roU. Michigan 48202

1

Mr. A. C D«trick
January 1 » . 1»73

iJ-L'C'IS^

The KHTSA than iasuad a Consumer P r o t e c t i o n B u l l e t i n a d v i s i n g the public of
the p o t e n t i a l problem and of the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the p r o t e c t i v e s h i e l d *
Both the NHTSA and General Motors continued t h e i r i n v e s t i g a t i o n s t o determine
i f a d d i t i o n a l s t e p s should be taken. General Motors has now decided that i t
i s in t h e b a s t i n t e r e s t s of i t s customers t o send a defect n o t i f i c a t i o n under
S e c t i o n 113 o f t h e National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.
573.4(c)(7)

I n s t a l l s h i e l d k i t 231460 on a l l affected v e h i c l e s ,

573.4(c)(8)
Copies of t h e dealer b u l l e t i n and owner l e t t e r w i l l be sent no
l a t e r than a t the time they are forwarded to d e a l e r s . A r e p r e s e n t a t i v e copy
of d e a l e r n o t i f i c a t i o n i s a t t a c h e d .
Very
Very tt rr u
u ll yy yours,
yours,

jy

J. C. Bates
Director, Service Section

Attachments
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§ 4:1.124

AUTOMOBILE DESIGN LIABILITY

NHTSA
Identification
Number

Date of
Company
Notification

72-0298

124-72

Make
Pontiac

Model

2d
Mode]
Year

Safaris and
197
Grand Safaris
Station Wagon

Number
of
Vehicles
144

Brief Description of Defect
Possibility that rear window defogger was incorrectly wired Wiring was wired directly
to fuse block in such way that use of defogger concurrently with directional signals,
back-up lights or rear power window could result in blowing 20 amp fuse iCorrect by
inspecting and re-wirmg properly where necessarv J
72-0303

Chevelle and
1973
693
Camino
1973
GMC
Sprint
Brief Description of Defect
Possibility that seat belt warning system may be rendered inoperative due to mismatmg of relay jumper wire assembly at parking brake alarm switch 'Correct by inspecting
and installing jumper wire with terminal and connectors that mate properly J
12-6-72

Chevrolet

3,083
1973
Chevrolet
Camero
Brief Description of Defect
Possibility that parking braKe pawl was improperly heat-treated If condition exists,
"soft" pawl causes pawl to bend or break, which would affect hold ability of parking
brake (Correct by inspecting and replacing pawl where necessary )

72-0304

12-6-72

72-0305

12-6-72

Chevrolet
Pontiac
Oldsmobile

73-0013

0-19-73

Chevrolet

3,225
1973
Nova
1973
Ventura
1973
Omega
Brief Description of Defect
Possibility that seat belt warning system will not function with vehicle in third gear
due to rotation of shift tube not always making contact with seat belt warning system
relay (Correct by inspecting and installing redesigned shift rod and new shift levers )

Pontiac
Oldsmobile
Buick

Biscayne
Bel Air
Impaia
Caprice
Catalma
Bonneville
Grandville
88 and 98
Lesabre
Centurion
Electra
Riviera

1971

3,707,064

1972
1971
1972
1971
1972
1971
1972

Brief Description of Defect
Possibility that while driving on unpaved road surfaces (particularly roads which are
heavily graveled, extremely wavy or filled with chuck holes) at speeds which cause car to
pitch excessively, front crossmember may scoop up loose stones or gravel and throw
them into engine compartment One of these stones could lodge between steering
coupling and frame and cause increased steering effort or interference with steering
control of car when steering wheel is turned to left (Correct by inspecting and installing
shield on affected vehicles )
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Roy Ronald LOWE, as Administrator of
the Estate of Lou Ann Lowe,
Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Roy FULFORD, as Administrator of the
Estate of Elva Fulford, Deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Nos. 77-2737, 77-2738.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
Aug. 29, 1980.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 9, 1980.

Husbands of two women who were
killed when the steering mechanism of the
automobile in which they were travelling
suddenly locked, causing the automobile to
go out of control, brought suit under the
Alabama wrongful death statute against
the manufacturer of the automobile. The
manufacturer removed the case to federal
court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.
After hearing the evidence, a jury rendered
a verdict for plaintiffs in the amount of
$500,000 each. The manufacturer then
moved for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial and
the District Court granted the motion for a
new trial, reasoning that it had committed
an error in its jury instruction. At the
second trial, the jury returned a verdict for
the manufacturer and judgment was entered on the verdict by the United States
District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama, Frank H. McFadden, Chief
Judge. Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court
of Appeals, Brown, Circuit Judge, held that:
(1) in Alabama, a violation of the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act is
evidence of negligence per se; (2) evidence
that the manufacturer violated the MVSA
by sending an inadequate recall notice
which did not warn of the possibility of a

total loss of steering control was relevant
and admissible; (3) the evidence presented
a jury question whether the manufacturer's
recall campaign gave adequate warning of
the dangerdto owners of the affected-automobiles ami-whether this was "Fgroxtmate
cause of the~deaths of plaintiffs^feeedests
(4) it waa-ftot unreasonable fo?^lre~ j wg~ft»
conclude th&tpthe warning proS&ecf STIte
manufacturer was inadequate and thus violated the MVSA; (5) the jury could reasonably have concluded that the manufacturer's violation of the MVSA was a proximate
cause of the accident; and (6) the verdict at
the first trial was reinstated and the case
remanded with instructions to fix remittiturs appropriate under the governing law.
Vacated and remanded.
1. Automobiles <s=»16
In products liability action brought under the Alabama wrongful death statute
which was removed to federal district court
by the defendant automobile manufacturer,
the district court's admission of evidence
tending to show that the manufacturer had
violated the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act did not amount to allowing a diceefc-sause of action under the
MVSA where the sole purpose of the evidence was to show that the manufacturer
was negligent per se. Code of Ala. 1975,
§ 6-5-410*r~Hational Traffic and Motor Vehicle SafefpAct of 1966, §§ 113, 151, 15
U.S.C.A. §§TI402, 1411.
2. Automobiles <s=>16
Wher&daetion against automobile manufacturer-waa-brought under the Alabama
wrongful deatit statute and the only relationship thai-tlia-manufaeturer's alleged violation of J&e-N&tional Traffic and Motor
Vehicle S^gJ^Act had to the lawsuit was
as evidencezofrmairofacturer's negligence,
such referencer-to the federal law to establish negligence did not metamorphose the
plaintiffs' wrongful death claim into a private cause of action under the MVSA.
Code of Ala.1975, § 6-5-410; National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1966, §§ 1KF151, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 140271411.
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3. Automobiles <£=*16
In Alabama, evidence that a defendant
has violated the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act is evidencerof negligence per se. National Traf£Ic-and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,_§§ 113, 151, 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 1402, 1411.
4. Automobiles <§=*16
In suit that was brought_under the
Alabama wrongful death statuS^and thereafter removed to federal cour^%hether the
defendant automobile manufacturer violated the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act and whether that violation proximately caused the death of plaintiffs' decedents were questions of fact-£or- the jury.
Code of Ala.1975, § £-5-410; National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1966, §§ 113, 151, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1402,1411.
5. Negligence <s=>6
If a statute creates a minimum standard of care, an unexcused violation, that is,
an act done with less that minimum care,
must be negligence.
6. Automobiles <8=>16
In products liability action which arose
out of fatal automobile accident that occurred when steering mechanism suddenly
locked, causing the automobile to go out of
control, evidence that the manufacturer violated the National Traffic and Motor vehicle Safety Act in connection with its recall
campaign was relevant and properly admissible to establish negligence. Code of Ala.
1975, § 6-5-410; National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, §§ 113, 151,
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1402, 1411.
7. Automobiles <s=>16
In wrongful death actioit-against autoBu>Bfe=flmnufacturer which^arose out of
&&3€teftfe 4n which automobile steering
mechaaismr unexpectedly lockedband caused
the^automobile to go out of control, evidence was sufficient to presents jury question whether the manufacturers recall campaign gave adequate warningr~to owners of
affected automobiles of the danger presented by a defect in the steering mechanism

decedents. Code of Ala.1975, § 6-5-410;
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act of 1966, §§ 113, 151, 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1402, 1411.
8. Automobiles <§=>16
Evidence that automobile manufacturer was aware that owners of certain of its
automobiles faced risk of a partial loss of
steering control due to a stone becoming
lodged between a coupling and the frame
was sufficient to warrant jury in concluding that the manufacturer might have
known that there was a risk of a total loss
of steering if a stone became lodged within
the steering coupling and that, therefore,
notice which the manufacturer sent to vehicle owners warning them of "the possibility
of a partial loss of steering control should a
stone lodge between the steering coupling
and the frame" and was not adequate to
comply with the warning requirements of
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act. National Traffic and Motbr
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, § 113(a), 15
U.S.C.A. § 1402(a).
9. Automobiles <&=>16
In view of evidence that automobile
owner, after receiving recall notice warning
of the possibility of a partial loss of steering
control should a stone become lodged between the steering coupling and the frame,
exercised more than reasonable diligence in
attempting to procure a coupling shield for
the automobile and to have shield installed
by an authorized dealer, jury could reasonably have concluded that had warning been
given of the extreme danger of a complete
loss of steering, such owner would in all
probability have been just as diligent and
might have completely refrained from driving the car and, therefore, that the manufacturer's inadequate notice of the actual
danger presented by the steering defect
was a proximate cause of the deaths of the
owner's wife and her daughter when the
steering mechanism locked and the car
went out of control and rolled over. Code
of Ala.1975, § 6-5-410; National Traffic
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10. Death ^ 9 3
Under the Alabama wrongful death
statute, damages are not designed to compensate the plaintiff for decedent's loss of
life, suffering or pecuniary loss but are
strictly punitive. Code of Ala. 1975, § 6-5410.
11. Death <^95(1)
The damages recoverable under the Alabama wrongful death statute depend on
the quality of the wrongful act and the
degree of culpability involved. Code of Ala.
1975, § 6-5-410.
12. Damages <s=>96
Under Alabama law, the amount of
damages to be awarded is largely within
the discretion of the jury; however, this
discretion is not absolute.
13. New Trial <s=>76(l)
Under Alabama law, the court may set
aside or reduce a verdict which it believes is
not merely overly generous but so excessive
as to demonstrate bias, passion, prejudice,
corruption or other improper motive or
cause.
14. Federal Courts <s=>415
In removed products liability action
that was brought under the Alabama
wrongful death statute, the Alabama standard governed the substantive issue whether the verdict was excessive. Code of Ala.
1975, § 6-5-410.
15. Federal Civil Procedure <§=*2347
A federal standard is applicable to resolve the procedural question whether a
federal district court, sitting in diversity,
should automatically grant a new trial on
the basis of excessive damages.
16. Federal Civil Procedure e=>2377
The law in the Fifth Circuit is that if a
judge finds that a jury verdict resulted
from passion or prejudice, the proper remedy is a new trial and not remittitur.
17. Federal Civil Procedure s=>2377
In proceeding to fix a remittitur, the
district court must be guided by the principle that a plaintiff who has been awarded
an excessive amount by one jury should

have the option of taking the maximum
amount that the jury could properly have
awarded 3jr~of taking a new trial before
another jury.
18. Federal Courts <$=>543
Any remittitur accepted by~me^5§&tiffs is not appealable.
Edward F. Morgan, Tuscaloosa Ala., C. 0.
Burkhalter, Gordo, Ala., for plaintiff-appellant Lowe.
Olin W. Zeanah, Wilbor J. Hust, Jr., Tuscaloosa, Ala., for plaintiff-appellant Fulford.
Charles A. Stewart, Jr., Birmingham,
Ala., Gen. Motors Corp., Detroit, Mich., Otis
M. Smith, Eugene D. Martenson, Birmingham, Ala., for defendant-appellee.
Appeals from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
Before BROWN, HILL and RANDALL,
Circuit Judges.
JOHN R^BROWN, Circuit Judge:
This is r products liability action which
arose out of an accident involving a 1971
Chevrolet Impala in which the steering
mechanism unexpectedly locked causing the
automobile to go out of control. The result
was the death of Mrs. Elva Fulford and her
daughter, Mrs. Lou Ann Lowe. The husbands of 4fee decedents brought this action
against tfi^manufacturer, General Motors
Corporatic3fF{GM), based upon the Alabama
WrongfufeBs&th Statute, 1975 Ala.Code sec.
6-5-410 (%merly 1958 Ala.Code, tit. 7, sec.
123). The-pFaintiffs alleged that negligence
per se waifgstablished by GM's violation of
the National. Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety AcCof 1966 (MVSA), 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1402 (m$y (current version at 15 U.S.
C.A. § 1411 (West Supp. 1980)).
[1] After hearing the evidence, a jury
rendered it. verdict for the plaintiffs in the
amounts s£ $500,000 each. The^ District
Court, however, ordered a new trial, reason-
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ing that allowing evidence of any violation
by GM of the MVSA to establish negligence
per se was the equivalent of allowing a
direct cause of action under the MVSA,
contravening the holding oi~€ort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, -45JLEd.2d 26
(1975).
The District Court held, in |fee alternative, that the verdicts were "excessive and
demonstrated] prejudice, bias^aad passion,"
and that if this were the <HS^ issue the
court would have required a ggw trial unless the plaintiffs agreed to aTemittitur of
$250,000. The District Court was also of
the opinion that even if a cause of action
existed under the MVSA, there-was a failure to prove proximate cause between the
violation of the Act and the accident
At the second trial, no evidence of violation of the MVSA was admitted, and the
jury rendered a verdict for the defendants.
The plaintiffs now appeal and we vacate
the order granting a new trial and the
judgment in the second trial and remand
for reinstatement of the first verdict.1

eled along the shoulder of the road for a
distance, and then overturned down an embankment.
A witness to the accident, J. C. Champion, was told by Mrs. Fulford, as she lay
injured in the automobile, that the car had
suddenly become impossible to steer. Mrs.
Fulford died in the ambulance on the way
to the hospital. Mrs. Lowe died in the
hospital a few days later.
Chester Bambarger, the wrecker driver
who towed the automobile away, examined
it and determined that the steering was
indeed locked. Upon a more careful examination of the undercarriage, he and an Alabama State Trooper, C. W. Barrentine,
found a stone lodged inside the steering
coupling.
II The Proceedings Below
At trial the plaintiffs asserted two theories of negligence on the part of GM—first,
defective design of the automobile and
second, failure to adequately warn the public of this defect.
With respect to the first theory of negligence, engineering expert for the plaintiffs,
Dr. Sachs Hanagud, made an independent
study of the vehicle and concluded that
there were two related causes for the accident: (1) blocked steering due to the stone
interference problem in the steering coupling which resulted in (2) the fracture of a
tooth of the Pitman shaft caused by metal
fatigue and the stress applied to unjam the
steering mechanism. It also was his opinion that the uncovered design of the steering coupling was an unsafe engineering design because it allowed rocks to fly up into
the bottom of the car and possibly lodge
between the coupling and the frame,
causing the steering to jam.

J. The Facts
In the early morning of September 17,
1973, Mrs. Fulford drove to pick up her
daughter, Mrs. Lowe, at the daughter's
home in Gordo, Alabama, to bring her back
to her own home in Tuscaloosa to spend a
few days. In order to get to her daughter's
house Mrs. Fulford, driving a 1971 Chevrolet Impala, had to travel on a gravel road.
At approximately 9:30 a. m., after picking up her daughter, the two were headed
back to Mrs Fulford's house along a paved
level highway, U.S. Highway 82. It was a
dea£rjdryjfey Traveling atjabsut 50 miles
-gez^^WZi _9iey overtook and- passed the
-milx>moBM5perated by JohnJCalvin Davis.
j[? dojscpMrs. Fulford went into the left
fenB and then, after she had overtaken the
Expert witness for the defense, Dr. Julcar, t>ack Into the right lane, straightening ian Doughty, was of the opinion that no
her course. Davis testified th^t suddenly stone interference problem caused this accithe Fulford automobile inexplicably angled dent. Another expert witness for the deto the left again, crossed the highway, trav- fense, Dr. Alfred D. Droulillard, was of the
1. The procedure of reinstating a lurv verdict in

Conwav v Chemical Leaman Tank Lines Inc
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opinion that the tooth of the Pitman shaft
fractured, not because of metal fatigue, but
on impact at the time of the accident, possibly, the defense asserts, when the vehicle
may have hit a concrete abutment as it
overturned.
Fulford and Lowe also contended that
GM failed to give the public proper warning
of these defects upon their discovery, in
violation of 15 U.S.C.A. § 1402(a), in effect
at the time of the accident, which stated:
Every manufacturer of motor vehicles
or tires shall furnish notification of any
defect in any motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment produced by such manufacturer which he determines, in good
faith, relates to motor vehicle safety, to
the purchaser (where known to the manufacturer) of such motor vehicle or motor
vehicle equipment, within a reasonable
time after such manufacturer has discovered such defect.
They claimed that GM violated this statute
in three ways, in (i) the untimeliness of the
notice, (ii) its inadequacy in describing the
amount of danger the defect created, and
(iii) GM's failure to provide enough steering
coupling shields for all the automobiles subject to the recall campaign.
First, the notice was not given within a
reasonable time after the defect was discovered. In 1971, GM learned that it was
possible for a stone to become lodged between the steering coupling and the frame,
resulting in partial loss of steering control.
All Chevrolet dealers were mailed notice of
this defect on May 19, 1972, but a recall
campaign of all 1971 and 1972 Chevrolet
automobiles equipped with power steering,
with notice to individual owners, was not
commenced until March 1973.
Second, Fulford and Lowe alleged that
the notice was inadequate. The letter sent
to Chevrolet owners urged them to have a
steering coupling shield installed by their
dealers at no extra cost, "to prevent the
possibility of a partial loss of steering control.
." The letter went on to say
that
[s]uch an incident could occur when you
drive your car on an unpaved road sur-

face if a stone should be thrown up into
the engine compartment where it can
lodge between the steering coupling and
the fraraeLTif this should happenv it may
cause increased steering effort ofTnterference with steering control S^ourca&
It is possible that it could even resuSFm a
partial lossrof steering control
The notieenHd" not say that it was possible
for a stone to become lodged inside the
steering coupling, possibly resulting in a
total loss of steering.
Third, the notice was inadequate because
GM did not make steering coupling shields
available at their dealerships in numbers
sufficient to implement the recall campaign. As of October 27, 1973, GM had
manufactured only 64,277 shields for the
more than 3,700,000 1971 and 1972 models
subject to the recall program. The morning
after Mr. Fulford received the recall notice,
he went to the Chevrolet dealer in Tuscaloosa, but the dealer did not have any steering coupling shields. He went back once or
twice more, but there were still no shields.
Mr. Fulford also tried to get the shield from
dealers in cities in Florida, Georgia, North
Carolina and South Carolina, but no one
had them- far all, Mr. Fulford went to no
less than I3~different dealerships throughout the south, and none of them had the
shields.
In its instructions to the jury in the first
trial, the DIs&ict Court included the following charge:
The plaintiffs however further contend
that the defendant was negligent in the
handling: 'sf its recall campaign. Congress has: passed what is known as the
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards Act.
This actrn pertinent parts provide (sic)
that every manufacturer of motor vehicles shaTCnotify the purchaser of that
vehicle of anjudefect which the manufacturer in good faith determines to exist if
the defectrrefetes to motor vehicle safety.
The manufacturer is required to do this
within a reasonable time after he discovers it. He is also required to give
informatjaaito the purchaser about methods of C0£Fe&ting the defect. Motor .vehi-
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cle safety is defined as the-performance
of motor vehicles in such a~manner that
the public is protected agairisFTinreasonable risk of accidents occurj^^as a result of the design, construction and performance of the vehicle and S-ralso protected against unreasonabl£_^risks of
death and injury in the event a t an accident.
This act creates the duty on-the part of
the manufacturer to notify the purchasers of the existence of defects which a
manufacturer determines in "good faith
relate to vehicle safety and to detail the
measures to be taken to repair it. This
duty arises whether the defect results
from negligence or not.
Now, if the defendant fails-to exercise
reasonable care in notification to the public, including the owner of this vehicle
and in directing ways to correct it, then
there would be negligence m the part of
the defendant. If you are reasonably
satisfied from the evidence that the defendant failed to use reasonable care in_
carrying out the notification responsibili-J
ty of the statute then you should find
that the defendant was negligent in this
respect. If, however, you are not reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the
defendant failed to use ordinary care in
notifying the plaintiff Fulford of the defect then you should find that the defendant was not negligent.
After the jury rendered a verdict of
$500,000 for each of the plaintiffs, GM filed
a motion for j.n.o.v. or in the alternative for
^ M S m L The District Courfcdenied the
Tfifftinrcfc j n.o.v. but grantedrthe motion
fi^ra Mwjrial, reasoning that the foregoS O k o X ^ r g e intimated that violation of
tire MVSA~was negligence per se.and there2.

In determining whether a private remedy is
implicit in a statute not expressly providing
one, several factors are relevant. First, is the
plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted ' [citations

by amounted to the allowance of a private
right of action under the MVSA. Relying
on the four guidelines set forth in Cort v.
Ash, supra? the District Court concluded
that there was no private remedy for negligence under the MVSA.
The Court went on the say that
evidence of negligence in the recall
campaign is admissible on the issue of a
manufacturer's design and manufacturing responsibilities including the duty to
warn. Nevels v. Ford Motor Company,
439 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1971); Larsen v.
General Motors Corporation, 391 F.2d 495
(8th Cir. 1968). The essence of the claim
is negligence and failure to carry out the
statutorily imposed duties is evidence of
negligence.
*

*

*

*

*

*

This is different however from saying
that the Act created a separate right of
action. Evidence of negligence in the
recall campaign per se will not support a
cause of action for damages. It is really
an extension of the common law duty to
warn, as plaintiffs' briefs suggest Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion that
it was error to submit the issue to the
jury on an independent theory of liability
under the Act.
At the second trial, however, the District
Court disallowed the introduction of any
evidence pertaining to reports and complaints to GM dating back to January 1,
1971, concerning the stone interference
problem, GM's remedial action with regard
to this problem, Fulford's unsuccessful attempts to secure a steering coupling shield
for his car, the recall campaign and correspondence writh the Department of Transportation, and Dr. Hanagud's testimony
deriving purposes of the legislative scheme to
imply such a remedy for the plaintiff5 [Citations omitted ] And finally, is the cause of
action one traditionally relegated to state

Cite as 624 F.2d 1373 (1980)

simply as evidence of GM's negligence.
The concept that violation of a criminal or
penal statute can be evidence of negligence
in a civil action is not new to tort law. "[I]t
is said tha£4he reasonable man would-obev
the criminaHaw, and that one wtatdogs not
is not acting as a reasonable BMH& ffirict
therefore must be negligent/' W,.rProsseii
III. The Motor Vehicle Safety Act—A Pri- Law of Teste. 191 (4th ed. 193] j&otnote
vate Right Of Action Or Evidence Of omitted).
Negligence Or Negligence Per Se?
"Motor vehicle safety" is defined in the
We conclude the District Court misinter- MVSA as
preted or misapplied the Supreme Court
the performance of motor Vehicles or
decision in Cort v. Ash when it used that
motor vehicle equipment in such a mandecision as the basis for granting defendner that the public is protected against
ant's motion for a new trial. In Cort v.
unreasonable risk of accidents occurring
Ash, jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim
as a result of the design, construction or
was founded on 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 as a
performance of motor vehicles and is also
claim arising under a Federal statute. The
protected against unreasonable risk of
Federal statute under which the plaintiff
death or injury to persons in the event
alleged his claim arose was 18 U.S.C.A.
accidents do occur, and includes nonoper§ 610, a criminal statute which provided no
ational safety of such vehicles.
civil remedy. The second count of the com- 15 U.S.C.A. § 1391(1) (1974) (emphasis addplaint presented a state law claim, but this ed.) Thus* the Act creates a duty upon the
was independent of the claim under § 610. automobile^ manufacturer to construct his
Jurisdiction over this state claim was pen- product to be "reasonably" safe. Under
dent to that of the Federal claim but was § 1402, it was also "reasonable" for the
not based on § 610 directly. Thus, the very manufacturer promptly to notify the ownexistence of the case in Federal Court de- ers of his product of any safety-related
pended on the theory of a private right of defect ancfetew-to remedy it.
action which, the plaintiff asserted, arose
This Court has often held that violation
under § 610.
of a Federal law or regulation can be eviThe case before us today presents quite a dence of negligence, and even evidence of
different situation, procedurally and sub- negligence^per^e. See, e. g., Reyes v. Vanstantively. It was brought in Alabama tage Steamship Company, Inc., 609 F.2d
State Court as an action based on the Ala- 140, 143 (5th Cir. 1980) (Coast Guard regulabama Wrongful Death Statute. It was re- tions); Manning v. M/V "Sea Road" 417
moved to Federal Court because diversity F.2d 603,^0S (5th Cir. 1969) (Safety and
jurisdiction existed. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 Health Regulations for Longshoring).
(West 1966 and West Supp. 1980). Fulford
[2] Th£ mere fact that the law which
and Lowe never asserted Federal jurisdic- evidences^aeglrgence is Federal while the
tion based on § 1331, arising under any negligence**action itself is brought under
Federal statute. Although the MVSA and State cofrassn law does not mean that the
its application might have significance or state lawxlaijrijnetamorphoses into a pribearing on the case, the suit was not to vate rightEBLaction under Federal regulaenforce the MVSA, nor would an applica- tory law. is Nevels v. Ford Motor Compation one way or the other necessarily have ny, 439 P a r 251 (5th Cir. 1971), a neglihad decisive consequences.
gence action under Georgia law, we held
concerning his opinion on the cause of the
accident. The Court then granted GM's
motion for a directed verdict on plaintiffs
theory of failure to warn, or to timely
warn, of the stone interference problem and
its dangers. The jury rendered a verdict
for GM.

Fulford and Lowe made it quite clear
that the only relationship the alleged violation of the MVSA had to this case was

that violation of § 1402 "was relevant [evidence] natnmly withrrespect to the statutory dutyr^rFord, but also in" regard to
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plaintiffs contention of negligent assembly
in the manufacturing process." Id. at 258.
Once this evidence was submitted to support the plaintiffs assertion_&Lnegligence,
the issue should go to the jury. Id. See
Chrysler Corporation v. Department of
Transportation, 472 F.2d 659JBQ n.13 (6th
Cir. 1972); see also Todd v. United States,
384 F.Supp. 1284, 1294 (HBB.Fla.1975);
Florida Freight Terminals, InE. x Cabanas,
354 So.2d 1222, 1225 (Fla.App3lK8) (Federal Air Regulations evidenced negligence
under Alabama law and Floridadaw respectively).
Nevels, supra, held that violation of the
MVSA was evidence of negligence, but did
not specifically hold that it was evidence of
negligence per se. However, that case relied on Georgia law to determine negligence. "In this diversity action, we are
bound by Georgia law with respect to the
measure of care owed by the manufacturer
to a third person." 439 F.2d at 255.
Turning to Alabama law in the diversity
case before us, we find that it states that
violation of a statute is negligence per se if
the following criteria are met:
(1) The trial judge must determine as a
matter of law that the statute was enacted to protect a class of persons which
includes the litigant seeking to assert the
statute.

[3] We conclude that under Fox violation of the MVSA is evidence of negligence
per se in Alabama. The purpose of the
MVSA "is to reduce traffic accidents and
deaths and injuries to persons resulting
from traffic accidents," by "establishing]
motor vehicle safety standards for motor
vehicles
" 15 U.S.C.A. § 1381.
Thus, it is clear that Mrs. Fulford, as the
driver, and Mrs. Lowre, as the passenger, of
the automobile whose manufacturer was
subject to the Act, were, as a matter of law,
within the class of persons protected. And
the trial judge so held in his order granting
a new trial, even if it was with respect to
the first criterion of Cort v. Ash. See note
2, supra. The trial judge also stated that
"[t]he Act was clearly designed to reduce
traffic accidents and the resulting deaths
and injuries." Therefore, the danger which
caused their deaths3 was allegedly the type
the Act guards against.
[4] Whether the statute was violated
and whether that violation proximately
caused the injury were questions of fact for
the jury. After the first trial, the District
Court judge gave proper instructions to the
jury on these two issues and in their general verdict the jury implicitly answered both
questions in the affirmative. Thus, all four
of the Fox criteria for finding negligence
per se were satisfied.

[5] We find another indication, within
the Act itself, that its violation is evidence
(2) The trial judge must find the injury of negligence per se in a tort action. 15
was of a type contemplated by the stat- U.S.C.A. § 1391(2) states:
ute.
"Motor vehicle safety standards"
*
*
*
*
*
*
means a minimum standard for motor
vehicle performance, or motor vehicle
(3) The party charged with negligent
equipment
performance, which is practiconduct must have violaterlliie statute.
cable, which meets the need for motor
*
*
*
*
*
*
vehicle safety and which provides objecpjQRrejury must find the-statutory viotive criteria.
latfott^pximately caused theJnjury.
To say that violation of a statute is negliFox v. Bartholf, 374 So.2d 294^295-96 (Ala. gence per se is to say that "an unexcused
violation is conclusive on the issue of negli1979) (citations omitted).
*

*

*

*

*

*

3. The defendants contested the fact that the
accident had caused Mrs Fulford's death, although they admitted it had caused the death

at the first trial In awarding Mr Fulford a
$500,000 verdict, the jury implicitly found that
Mrs Fulford's death was indeed caused by the
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gence." Prosser, supra at 200. If the statute in question creates a minimum standard
of care, as it does here, then an unexcused
violation, an act done with less than minimum care, would have to be negligence.
[6] We conclude that the jury charges in
the first trial on violation of the MVSA as
evidence of negligence per se were correct,
and that Cort v. Ash was not at all at issue
in this case. Since evidence of GM's violation of the MVSA was relevant and properly admissible, the verdict of the second trial,
in which no evidence of this violation was
admitted, cannot stand. We believe the
proper action to take is to reverse the order
granting a new trial and remand to reinstate the jury verdict of the first trial, at
least as to the issue of negligence.
IV. Causation
Disposing of the Cort v. Ash issue, the
principal ground on which the District
Court relied in granting a new trial, we
must face the first of the Court's other two
comments concerning the jury verdict.
These comments, appearing in the order
granting a new trial, were dicta at the time.
But on remand they must be addressed to
determine whether the first verdict is to be
reinstated in whole or in part.
With respect to the theory of liability due
to GM's negligence in conducting a recall
campaign pursuant to the MVSA, the District Court commented that "even if a cause
of action exists under the statute there was
a failure of proof [of] proximate cause and
on that issue defendant would be entitled to
a directed verdict."
We have already determined that no private right of action was at issue in this
case. Since this comment was made after
the jury rendered its verdict, we assume the
District Court meant that but for a new
trial it would have granted a j.n.o.v.
Our review of the comment on causation,
therefore, will be under the same standard
we would use if the District Court actually
had granted a directed verdict or j.n.o.v.
This standard, which applies in both Federal law and diversity cases, is set forth in
Boeing Company v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365
(5th Cir. 1969) (en banc):

On motions for directed verdict and for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict
the Court-Should consider all of the evidence not-just that evidence whicfr-suj>ports the-non-mover's case b^"H! the
light and-with all reasonable -stfeFeaeei
most favorable to the party oggosea i&
the motion. If the facts ancTinferences
point so strongly and overwhelmingly in
favor of one party that the Court believes
that reasonable men could not arrive at a
contrary verdict, granting of the motions
is proper. On the other hand, if there is
substantial evidence opposed to the motions, that is, evidence of such quality and
weight that reasonable and fair-minded
men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions,
the motions should be denied^ and the
case submitted to the jury. A~mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to present
a question for the jury. The motions for
directed verdict and judgment n. o. v.
should not be decided by which side has
the better of the case, nor should they be
granted only when there is a complete
absence of-grobative facts to support a
jury verdict. There must be a conflict in
substantial evidence to create a jury
question. However, it is the function of
the jury as-the traditional finder of the
facts, and nofHhe Court, to weigh conflicting evidence and inferences, and determine the credibility of witnesses,
(Footnote omitted.) Id at 374-75.
[7] UnderJ&tis standard we believe that
there was suffment evidence submitted for
the trial court fallow the jury to determine whether-QM's recall campaign gave
inadequate m&mxtg of the danger to 1971
Chevrolet Impala owners and whether this
was a proximate cause of the deaths of Mrs.
Fulford and MEL Lowe.
The notice sent out to Impala owners
warned them of "the possibility of a partial
loss of steering control should a stone lodge
between the^g£@srtng coupling and"~the
frame . .
^Emphasis added.jT^hisL
accident invqgga wnomulete loss nf *Vn™*~r
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ing control due to a stone lodged inside the been just as diligent and completely refrained from driving the car.4 Considering
steering coupling.
[8] There is evidence 4o support GM's all the relevant evidence, we do not believe
argument that they had never known a there was a failure to establish the link of
stone to lodge inside the sfeenng-coupling, causation between noncompliance with the
and that in their experiments and tests, MVSA and the accident itself.
they had not been able even te-get a stone
V. Prejudice And Passion, Or
to lodge in the steering -couplmg unless
Only Generosity?
placed there by hand. GM argues that this
implies they could not possiM^-have known
The District Court also commented on the
of this risk and therefore had no duty to size of the verdict awarded by the jury—
warn of this particular danger.
$500,000 for each of the plaintiffs. The
But making all the reasonable inferences Court felt that these verdicts were "excesin favor of the plaintiffs, we helieve that sive and demonstrate^] prejudice, bias and
there was sufficient evidence injtheir favor passion." The Court stated that, if this
to let the issue go to the jury. -The risk of were the only ground on which to consider a
partial loss of steering due to a stone lodged new trial, he would have so ordered unless
between the coupling and the frame and each plaintiff agreed to a remittitur of
the risk of total loss of steering due to a $250,000.
stone lodged within the steering^ coupling
[10-12] The damages awardable under
are quite similar dangers. It is not unreasonable to infer that if GM knew of one the Alabama Wrongful Death Statute are
risk, they might have known of the other. strictly punitive. They are not designed to
Thus, the jury's conclusion that the warning compensate the plaintiff for the decedent's
loss of life, suffering, or pecuniary loss.
was inadequate is not unreasonable.
Bonner v. Williams, 370 F.2d 301, 303 (5th
[9] Of course, a finding of negligence Cir. 1966); Alabama Power Co. v. Irwin,
through violation of the statute is only the 260 Ala. 673, 72 So.2d 300 (1954). "The
first step. There must also be evidence punishment by way of damages is intended
that this negligence caused the accident. not alone to punish the wrongdoer, but as a
This is where we disagree with the District deterrent to others similarly minded." LibCourt. The recall campaign letter instruct- erty National Life Insurance Co. v. Weldon,
ed Mr. Fulford to procure from, and have 267 Ala. 171, 100 So.2d 696, 713 (1957). The
installed by an authorized dealer, a coupling damages recoverable under this act, thereshield for the automobile. As outlined ear- fore, depend upon the "quality of the
lier, he exercised more than reasonable dili- wrongful act and the degree of culpability
gence in his efforts to do so and to make his involved.,, Bonner, supra, 370 F.2d at 303;
car as safe as possible. We determine that Irwin, supra, 72 So.2d at 304.
from this and all the other pertinent evi[13] The amount of damages to be
dence, the jury could reasonably have conclud$dbrUia&-had the Lowes beea~warned of awarded is largely within the discretion of
fiicr-exfeeme danger of a complete loss of the jury. General Telephone Co. v. Cornish,
ateermgr-fchey would in all probability have 291 Ala. 293, 280 So.2d 541 (1973); Airheart
4^ 33ie-Dis£nct Court states in its order that
"{b]etween closing argument and charge, plaintiffs abandoned the theory of negligence in providing the means for correcting the defect "
Whatever form the abandonmenttyf this theory
took, we cannot know since it was done off the
record The jury instructions did not mention
this theory of negligence specifically In refer-

attempting to reinstate a theory of negligence
abandoned by the plaintiffs Nevertheless, the
evidence remained in the record and, as explained in the text above, is significant on the
separate issue of causation
We point out that the current version of the
statute, 15 U S C A §§ 1411, 1413, 1414 (West
Supp

1980) reOUires an a n t n m n h i l p

msnnfar-

Cite as 624 F

v. Green, 267 Ala. 689, 104 So.2d 687 (1958).
However, this discretion is not absolute.
Airheart, supra, 104 So.2d at 687; Weldon,
supra, 100 So.2d at 713. Under Alabama
law, the Court may set aside or reduce a
verdict which it believes is not merely overly generous but so excessive that it demonstrates "bias, passion, prejudice, corruption
or other improper motive or cause." Airheart, supra, 104 So.2d at 690.
[14,15] While the state standard above
would apply to the substantive issue of
whether the verdict in this case was excessive, a Federal standard applies to determine the slightly different procedural question of whether a Federal District Court,
sitting in diversity, should automatically
grant a new trial on the basis of excessive
damages. Galard v. Johnson, 504 F.2d 1198,
1200, n.l (7th Cir. 1974); 11 Wright & Miller § 2802 (1973). And always lurking is
the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a
jury trial. See Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson
Chemical Corp., 429 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir.
1970), modified, 456 F.2d 180, cert denied,
407 U.S. 921, 92 S.Ct. 2463, 32 L.Ed.2d 807
(1972).
[16] Technically, the law in the Fifth
Circuit is that if a Judge finds a jury verdict to result from passion or prejudice, the
proper remedy is a new trial, and not remittitur. Brabham v. State of Mississippi, 96
F.2d 210, 213 (5th Cir. 1938); Glazer v.
Glazer, 278 F.Supp. 476 (E.D.La.1968).
In more recent years, however, District
Courts in this Circuit have been less hesitant to remit vast jury verdicts which they
felt to be "grossly excessive" or "more than
the law would permit," provided liability
was clearly established. Edward v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co,, 512 F.2d 276, 281-83 (5th
Cir. 1975); Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson
Chemical Corp., supra. District Courts
have not hesitated to remit even punitive
damages. Gilbert v. St Louis-San Francisco Railroad Co., 514 F.2d 1277, 1280-81 (5th
Cir. 1975); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
351 F.2d 702, 718 (5th Cir. 1965). In these
5. Edwards— $900,000 reduced to $450,000
Gorsalitz—$1,380,000 reduced to $690,633
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cases the remittiturs reduced the verdicts
by one-half, two-thirds or even more.5
By suggesting that the verdicts in the
case before ua could be cured by remittiturs
of $250,000 each, we conclude thafcih^Kstrict Court did not really believe that & new
trial on thirissue was absolutelyaiecessaE£
due to bias,-passion and prejudices 3fcW2&.
instead, addressing the similar altlougli 35*
tinct question of "just too much," that is,
excessiveness. Cf. Gulf Coast Building and
Construction Trade Council v. F. R. Hoar &
Son, Inc., 370 F.2d 746, 749 (5th Cir. 1967);
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702
(5th Cir. 1965), affirmed, 388 U.S. 130, 87
S.Ct. 1975, 18 L Ed.2d 1094 (1967). Therefore, we remand this case to the District
Court with instructions to fix remittiturs
appropriate under the governing law.
[17,18] In determining the appropriate
remittiturs, the District Court must heed
the maximum recovery rule, the standard
set forth in Glazer, supra and adopted by
this Circuit in Gorsalitz, supra :
In proceeding to fix the remittitur,
then, the Court will be guided by the
principle that the plaintiff who has been
awarded an excessive amount by one jury
should hspre^the option of taking the maximum amount that the jury could properly have awarded or of taking a new trial
before another one. In determining this,
it appearspproper first to fix the amount
that [the District] Court thinks a properly
functioning jury would have awarded,
and this may be merely another way of
saying that the starting point is the
amount of damages the Court itself
thinks proger on the record under the
mandate-of the Court of Appeals. After
that, the asffiErimum recovery rule requires
the Court to determine the maximum
amount ~B£ deviation from that verdict
that couldJbe-ailowed without requiring a
new trial.
Glazer, supra, at 482. Any remittitur accepted by the plaintiffs would not be appealable Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co.,
Inc, 429 U.S. 648, 97 S.Ct. 835, 51 L.Ed.2d
Curtis —$3351X8)00 reduced to $400,000. Gilben —$225#0CFreduced to $60,000.
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112 (1977); Krahn v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 559
F 2d 308 (5th Cir. 1977). Of course, if the
plaintiffs refuse to remit, the~District Court
may order a new trial strictly-on the issue
of damages. See Lehrman—X^ Gulf Oil
Corp., 464 F.2d 26, 47 (5th~€S>, cert denied, 409 U.S. 950, 93 S.Ct 687t 34 L.Ed.2d
665 (1972).
VI.

Conclusion

Thus, we vacate the District-Hurt's order
granting a new trial and the~j**dgment of
the second trial. We reinstate the verdict
of the first trial as to liabilit^negligence,
and proximate cause of some damages and
the District Court shall enter a judgment in
accordance with that verdict, with whatever remittitur, if any, as it deems appropriate under Gorsalitz. If plaint&fsulecline to
make the remittitur, then the District Court
may order a new trial solely on the issue of
damages.
VACATED and REMANDEDT
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FILTROL CORPORATION, a Delaware
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In a diversity case, a city in Mississippi

some adjacent property, allegedly because
defendant business corporation had contaminated its property and the adjacent property with acid having a corrosive effect upon
ordinary sewer pipes. In the United States
District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi at Jackson, William Harold Cox,
J., an appeal was directed for the defendant
at the close of the city's evidence. City
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Sam D.
Johnson, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) city
was entitled to recover costs of protecting
its interceptor sewer line if it could show
that costs were incurred as direct result of
escape of business corporation's acid into
city's right-of-way, but city would have to
show that costs incurred were reasonable,
and corporation would have opportunity to
show that city failed to mitigate its damages, and (2) if the business corporation's
land became permanently contaminated
with acid before city bought easement, city
could not recover from corporation decrease
in value of land caused by contamination,
but city could nonetheless recover special
damages which it suffered because of the
contamination, particularly where no one
knew of permanent contamination of subsurface soil at time city purchased the land
and thus contamination could not have influenced price paid by city for its easement.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and
remanded.
1. Indemnity <s=*8(2)
Agreement whereby city agreed to indemnify and save harmless business corporation from any and all loss resulting from
any damage "arising out of or resulting
from or in any manner caused by the location, construction, operation and maintenance and presence" of sewer main upon
and across such business corporation's easement applied to furnish indemnity for damages which city incurred because it had to
locate sewer line in contaminated soil on
corporation's easement, and same was true
though business corporation when it drafted
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wen,—it you want to relate now to the steering gear or
the couplingr there*s no difference between the B car
and the truck, they're the same.

Q.

Right.

I think it's clear, but let's take it even more

so.
When you were doing your
demonstration on the B cars then you were trying to
attempt to demonstrate interference between the
flexible coupling and the frame; is that right?
A.

That was one of the things I was demonstrating,
attempting to demonstrate, yes, would demonstrate
because you could demonstrate it by selecting rocks and
hand placing them in there.

Q.

But dropping them didn't work?

A.

It's hard to do it dropping.
MR. HANSEN:

Okay.

Do you have

the document with you that he's reviewed that he's
referred to the diagram of the accident scene?
MR. CLEGG:

Yes.
(Off the record)

MR. HANSEN:
Q.

(By Mr. Hansen, continuing:)

On the record.

Mr. Confer, I am just

reviewing now the Nay accident scene diagram that has
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